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Art—literature, drama, music, dance, visual art, decoration, etc.—
is universal. All cultures engage in it in at least some art forms; 
almost all humans enjoy it in at least some forms. This is a Good 
Thing. Perhaps this is obvious, but being philosophers, we must 
ask why. Why is art universal? Why do humans enjoy it? Why are 
these things good? 
A second question. In all cultures, there are artistic standards. 
Some performances, some productions, some creations are 
thought to be better than others, and while there might not be 
universal agreement on which of these are better, there is general 
agreement that it takes discernment, knowledge, and taste to 
appreciate the better ones. In short, there are in every culture some 
fine things that not everybody can appreciate. Most think that this 
is a Good Thing. But why? What’s the value of expending effort in 
the production and consumption of artistically elevated products? 
And how does this square with the universal value of art? Isn’t it 
odd that in every society, art is valued, but that at the same time 
not every member of the culture can grasp the finer points that 
make it especially valuable? 
A final question. Though art is universal, the specific forms that 
art takes in different cultures are not universal. Chinese opera 
sounds very different from gamelan; yet, each has value to those 
who know. But how can works that are so different both be 
valuable? What are the non-aesthetic “natural” qualities that make 
them good? Are aesthetic standards or values culture-specific? And 
how does this sit with universality? Isn’t it odd that while art is 
valued in all cultures, the actual content of what is valued is 
different from culture to culture? 
In a series of papers, I have been developing a hedonist, or 
pleasure-grounded, approach to these questions. In order to do 
this, I have first attempted to define a special kind of pleasure that 
is especially relevant to the aesthetic context. Crucially, this kind of 
pleasure is functionally defined. This helps me set aside certain 
objections to hedonism that are based on a view of pleasure as a 
mere sensation. Then I show that there is a kind of “cultural 
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learning” that this kind of pleasure induces. This helps me account 
for the cultural specificity of art appreciation, which on certain 
other approaches is at odds with the presence of art in all societies. 
Cultural learning also helps me answer the question of elevated 
artworks: it is a universal phenomenon that creates heightened 
sensitivity, but not in all.1 
1.  Two Approaches to the Universality of Art 
Why is art universally valued? Speaking very broadly, there are two 
approaches to these questions. 
Objectivists start from the goodness of art itself. Good art is 
intrinsically admirable—in and of itself, it ought to be admired. It is, 
consequently, natural for humans to make and admire it. This is 
why the production and consumption of art are universal. It is, 
moreover, why all of this activity is good. G. E. Moore was a 
thinker in this vein: he actually defined the beautiful as that which it 
is good to admire.  
Objectivists have a plausible answer to why not everybody is 
capable of appreciating art. It is not easy to see what is good about 
an art work; this requires knowledge and taste. But they have 
something of a hard time with cultural variability: if there is 
something objectively good about gamelan, why aren’t the Chinese 
crazy about it? 
Subjectivists don’t think that art is good in itself. They start from 
the goodness of a motivationally positive response to it. I enjoy 
watching Game of Thrones; this enjoyment is a good thing—
enjoyment is valuable as such, provided that it doesn’t lead to a 
1 My aim here is to present these ideas to an audience that includes 
non-philosophers and non-academics. Though the present paper is 
new in several ways—particularly in its articulation of certain 
theoretical problems in sections 2-6, and the emphasis of 
functional definition—I want to acknowledge that I have 
developed these ideas in a more specialist form in several other 
places. These include: “The Pleasure of Art,” Australasian 
Philosophical Review 1 (2017): 6-28, “Constructing Aesthetic Value: 
Responses to My Commentators,” Australasian Philosophical Review 
1 (2017): 100-111, and “New Prospects for Aesthetic Hedonism,” 
in J. McMahon (ed) Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, 
Reflection and Accountability. (London: Routledge, 2018): 13-33. 
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nullifying harm. Art is enjoyable in this way; it has instrumental 
value. In short, it is not admired because it is good, as the 
objectivists say; rather, it is good because it is enjoyed. It is natural, 
subjectivists say, for humans to try to make and do things that they 
and others enjoy. This is why art and its admiration are universal.  
Hedonism is a special form of subjectivism. It holds that art 
consumption is motivated by the desire for pleasure, which gives it 
value when it is achieved. Most aesthetic hedonists think that the 
pleasure in question is of a special sort, and that this accounts for 
the fineness and non-universal accessibility of “high” art. 
Subjectivists have a hard time with artistic standards and critical 
values. If art is universal because of an innate tendency to enjoy it, 
then it is very strange indeed that some people don’t enjoy what is 
best in it. On the other hand, subjectivists are comfortable with 
cultural variability. Different people like different things, don’t 
they? 
That’s an overview of the two approaches. Let me now outline 
and expand on some of the problems that the theorist of aesthetic 
value faces. 
2.  The Problem of Aesthetic Obligation 
Objectivists think that admiring art is good because art itself is 
good, independently of its being admired. They have a problem 
because it is pretty mysterious how an objective quality can 
normatively command admiration. They say, in effect, that I am 
obliged to admire good art for no other reason than that it is good 
art. What kind of obligation is this?  
The value of aesthetic admiration is mysterious even to one 
who admits that there are things that do enjoin admiration because 
of their intrinsic value. Suppose that all that we think good about 
Mohandas Gandhi and Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King 
and Mother Theresa is true—each changed the horrible plight of 
millions for the better non-violently, but at a huge cost to 
themselves. I happen to think that it is morally deficient not to 
admire them. Perhaps you disagree. But allow me this for the sake 
of argument. Nothing turns on this concession as far as art goes.  
The question is this. Does a parallel duty carry over to, say, 
Andy Warhol? I enjoy Warhol’s work (kinda). I am better off for 
this: Warhol provides me with pleasure that I wouldn’t have had 
otherwise. But aside from an opportunity for enjoyment foregone, 
why would it have been bad not to appreciate his work? Would it 
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be a cognitive failure on my part and bad for this reason? Not 
necessarily. (And anyway, who says that all cognitive failures are 
bad?) For I could clearly recognize Warhol’s innovations and 
artistic virtues, but still not feel any admiration for them. He might 
have left me cold; increasingly, I find that he does. How am I falling 
short? Perhaps, the novelty is waning—but is the objectivist 
allowed to tolerate ennui as a legitimate response to objective 
value? 
Objectivists say that Warhol commands aesthetic admiration in 
the way that Mother Theresa commands moral admiration. There 
is something mysterious about this. Or actually worse than 
mysterious—pretentious, highfalutin, twee. Nor does it help to go 
small on the point—to admit that aesthetic appreciation is a small 
obligation, but insist that it is an obligation nonetheless. The 
appreciation of art can be big and consuming, but, on the face of 
it, just the wrong sort of thing to be the subject of approbation and 
censure. I may miss out when I fail to enjoy a great work of art. But 
what norm or value have I violated? 
This is the problem of aesthetic obligation. 
3.  The Problem of Critical Values 
Despite the problem of aesthetic obligation—which, by the way, is 
very little discussed in philosophical aesthetics—most 
philosophers of art think that objectivism has had the better of the 
dispute with subjectivism. I’ll mention just two reasons why, and 
why they don’t settle the issue.  
The first is that the discourse of artistic evaluation doesn’t 
revolve around personal responses such as pleasure. When we talk 
about great art, we often talk about how pleasurable it is, but this 
is always subordinated to considerations of its emotional depth, 
innovation, intellectual complexity, formal elegance, skilled 
presentation, and so on. In fact, while many affirm that art ought 
to be enjoyable, nobody seriously thinks that this suffices—
typically, they think that enjoyment should arise from a correct 
appraisal of the sorts of qualities I just mentioned. To the extent 
that these qualities are independent of individual response, this is 
puzzling to the subjectivist.  
Sure, it’s puzzling to the subjectivist, but isn’t it puzzling to 
everybody—including the objectivist? For critical discourse just 
invites and recapitulates the motivational question raised in the 
previous section. Sure, Warhol was a very important artist—
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innovative, transformative, elegant, skilled, etc. But what if I 
cognize all of this, but am still not moved by him. What would be 
wrong, or even reprehensible, with that? Objectivists are not wrong 
to cite the subject-independent character of critical discourse as a 
point in their favour. Their difficulties lie not there, but in the 
motivational and affective force of all of this discourse—they can’t 
account for it, or if they can, they can do so only ad hoc, by saying 
something like, “Of course, I like elegance—doesn’t everybody?” 
But that’s not the point: the question is why they should.  
Secondly, and relatedly, many great works of art are not 
enjoyable in the most straightforward sense of the term. For one 
thing, they require effort. Given the choice between reading the 
Mahabharata and reading (or watching) Game of Thrones, many would 
find the first daunting and the second seductive. It’s very tempting 
just to pour yourself a nice cold glass of wine and stretch out with 
a page-turner. Enjoyment-wise, it’s a no-brainer. Yet, the 
Mahabharata is a finer work of art. Doesn’t this contradict the 
subjectivist?  
A lot of great art is emotionally and affectively challenging. It’s 
depressing to think of good people coming to bad ends, as so often 
they do in great novels and plays. And what about atonal music and 
the like? You can’t really say—can you?—that Alban Berg’s Lulu—
in which nothing good happens to anybody and, on top of that, the 
music is tough to whistle—is more enjoyable than Fiddler on the Roof. 
And yet—I’m just going to go out on a limb here—nobody would 
deny it’s greater art.  
Objectivists are likely to say, for reasons like these, that the 
questions we asked at the beginning are somewhat confused. 
What’s true is that most people like stories, acting, pretty colours, 
catchy tunes, strong rhythms, etc. What’s not true is that they enjoy 
great art. All cultures produce art, it’s true—but it’s also true that 
all cultures place a higher value on cognitively difficult art. And that 
forces us to distinguish two quite different questions. The first is: 
Why is story-telling, music-making, dancing both universal and 
good? The second is: Why do all cultures recognize and value great 
art, given that only a select few in the culture are able to enjoy it?  
It is unclear how subjectivism can provide a satisfactory answer 
to the second question. On the face of it, it is well equipped to say 
what is good about Netflix and Spotify, but less well-positioned to 
navigate the ways of criticism. Unfortunately, though, objectivism 
doesn’t come through this unscathed. For it has a hard time with 
the first question. If it is cognitively difficult to appreciate high 
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standards in art, why do all cultures distinguish between elevated 
and quotidian art, and why do some members of all cultures like 
the former? 
This leaves us in a difficult situation. On the one hand, it 
doesn’t seem that aesthetic norms are motivationally or rationally 
self-supporting, even if we allow that some moral norms are. As a 
consequence, it’s hard to say what they are based on, if not on 
audience response. On the other hand, informed aesthetic 
evaluation seems to be based not on response, but on something 
much more difficult to pin down—well-informed taste, or 
something like that. So: what’s so great about well-informed taste?  
4.  The Problem of the Natural Ground 
Objectivists think that artworks have intrinsic merit; subjectivists 
think that they are valuable because of how they affect audiences. 
For both camps, there is the question: In virtue of what? What 
natural or non-aesthetic qualities make these things valuable, either 
in themselves or as objects of consumption by an audience? We’ve 
already considered this question in the context of cultural 
difference. If gamelan is valuable because of some natural quality it 
possesses, then why is it that cultivated and discriminating people 
in China, India, and Los Angeles don’t immediately recognize its 
value? 
In light of this question, consider now the case of abstract 
expressionism. This movement was inspired by the urge to erase 
pictorialism in visual art. Not only pictorialism, but all of the 
accoutrements of pictures, including perspective, points of view, 
points of focus, and distance, and to substitute for these other 
structures that consist of mere pattern, mere colour, and mere 
material. Now, one can ask: what makes this art, or the response to 
it, valuable? Subjectivists are going to have a problem answering 
because so many people in the world find abstract expressionism 
absurd and trivial. Objectivists are also going to have a problem 
because though they can say a lot about the formal properties of 
works in this genre, they have a lot of difficulty saying why anybody 
should care. And yet, abstract expressionism is a clear case of an 
art form. It’s wrong to dismiss it, from some God’s-eye perspective 
as it were, by calling it ‘decadent’ or ‘delusional’ or something like 
that. And, of course, it would similarly be terribly wrong to suggest 
that there could be an art-form that captures the attention of many 
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people in a culture, whether it be gamelan or hip-hop or atonal 
music, that somehow falls short of the mark.  
Now, one way out of this quandary is to appeal to the cultural 
context of the genre. Here’s Peter Schjeldahl, writing not 
specifically about abstract expressionism, but about a certain ethos 
in New York City that helped incubate the movement.  
To qualify as hip [in New York around 1960], you 
registered fine distinctions—between a photograph 
of Marilyn Monroe and Andy Warhol’s silkscreen 
of a photograph of her, say, or between Carl 
Andre’s stack of bricks on a gallery floor and a stack 
of bricks anywhere else. Skeptical attitudes, averse 
to mimesis and metaphor, put a withering pressure 
on painting, including even the simplest 
abstraction. Barely passing muster were the evenly 
pencilled grids of Agnes Martin, the broody 
monochromes of Brice Marden, and Ryman’s 
taciturn brushstrokes. What you saw, while not a 
lot, stayed seen. (The New Yorker, 21-28 December, 
2015: http://tinyurl.com/nto54wg.)  
There are two key ideas in Schjeldahl’s evocative description. The 
first is the prevalence of attitudes that are “averse to mimesis and 
metaphor.” If you try to take in the works of 1960s New York 
without having thoroughly absorbed these sceptical attitudes, 
you’re not going to find them very interesting. And the second is 
that you need to “register fine distinctions.” You have to be able 
to tell the difference between a stack of bricks made by Carl Andre 
in an art gallery and a stack of bricks at a construction site. These 
ideas go right to the heart of the questions we are asking. How can 
the objectivist admit that there is such a thing as “qualifying as hip 
in New York City,” as opposed to being hip period?—according to 
her, aesthetic attitudes have universal validity. And how can the 
subjectivist allow that “fine distinctions” matter, if most people 
don’t even register them? 
Now, Schjeldahl’s attitude strikes me as correct. But it raises a 
question. What exactly is the difference between Andre’s stack of 
bricks on a gallery floor and a stack of bricks on the street outside? 
And similarly, what is the difference between Rothko’s expanses of 
colour, and expanses of colour found in nature, or in an elementary 
school art class? Clearly nothing cognitively obvious: Schjeldahl is 
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correct to say that the distinction is a fine one. In view of the 
superficial counter-intuitiveness of abstract art, it is instructive to 
think about its appeal and value. How does it fit into the universal 
appeal of art? 
The problem of aesthetic obligation is compounded by the 
highly time- and place-specific appeal of art forms like abstract 
expressionism. Clearly, there is something in it that rightly enthralled 
mid-twentieth century New Yorkers. Yet that appeal is parochial. 
Nobody could say that a 19th century native of Malabar or a 
cultivated member of the Ottoman court in the eighteenth century 
would have been remiss to be unappreciative of Rothko. This is a 
puzzle for the objectivist: what quality does Rothko share with 
Osman or with Ravi Varma—what is the quality that in all of them 
commands appreciation? Classically, the answer was beauty, but 
the differences among these painters argues against a unitary 
account. If Rothko is beautiful, why would he not appeal to 
somebody in the Ottoman court? But it is equally a puzzle for the 
subjectivist. What is the response that confers value on all three of 
these artists? Classically, the answer is pleasure. But why is it not 
shared by all humans? 
There is one other way to avoid the problem of the natural 
ground. One could say that the value of a work of art—or even its 
beauty—depends in an “organic,” or “holistic” way, on not only its 
intrinsic qualities, but also its historical and cultural context. Now, 
I am not inclined entirely to dismiss this suggestion. Intuitively, 
context is relevant in some way to the examples mentioned above: 
Ravi Varma is valuable in early twentieth century South India, but 
not so much in mid-century New York City. The difficulty really 
lies in answering the question, “Why?” What is it about a particular 
culture that contributes to value? It can’t be mere conformity, 
because the abstract expressionists were non-conformists, as were 
so many other artists in history. Nor can it be some purely cognitive 
factor, like the democratizing thrust of Warhol’s work, because 
however interesting they might be, these factors don’t command 
appreciation. Obviously, then, culture plays a role in determining 
the natural ground of aesthetic value. But unless one can say how 
and why, this doesn’t take us very far.  
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5.  Facilitating Pleasure2 
Let me step aside from these questions, now, to describe a certain 
kind of pleasure that I call facilitating pleasure. But before I get to 
that, let me identify and set aside a kind of pleasure that many 
discussions of hedonism focus on.  
Except when they are sleeping (and, actually, even then), 
organisms constantly find themselves in a condition that is difficult 
to maintain. Energetic activity brings about fatigue, which makes it 
hard to continue. Deprivation is also taxing; if one does not eat or 
drink for a while, one becomes hungry or thirsty. When these 
conditions come to an end, one feels a sensation of relief—a sip of 
water when you are thirsty, taking a break from your bike ride or 
run. This kind of pleasure, which I call relief pleasure, is retrospective 
because it welcomes the end of a state of effort or deprivation. You 
do something; it causes you pleasure, but this pleasure doesn’t 
affect what you did, because what you did is already in the past.  
When philosophers think of pleasure, they often have 
something like relief pleasure in mind—a rewarding sensation that 
comes after something you do. This is different from aesthetic 
pleasure as I think of it. In my conception, aesthetic pleasure 
concurrently affects how you attend to a work of art; it isn’t merely 
a retrospective reward. 
To introduce the kind of pleasure that I think is involved think 
first of complexly coordinated acts like drinking water. It may not 
seem so at first glance, but this is not a simple task. When you drink 
a glass of water, you have to use your hand to feed liquid into your 
mouth at the proper rate—you’ve learned to do it and this seems 
easy, but take one look at a young child dribbling water as she 
drinks, and you’ll see how coordinated you have to be. Your mouth 
must be poised to receive and retain the liquid, and then to pass it 
on to the stomach. The muscular contractions of your mouth, 
pharynx, and oesophagus must be precisely sequenced and 
coordinated; your epiglottis must simultaneously be shut off to 
prevent water being taken into the lungs. All of these movements 
are repeated rhythmically—gulp, gulp, gulp. If you mistime or omit 
any—if you take in too much and gag, or too little and swallow 
air—corrective action is needed. The brain’s autonomic control of 
this coordinated action requires sensory feedback and fine 
2 The argument in the following sections closely parallels parts of 
the earlier published papers mentioned in note 1.  
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adjustment. This requires processing resources in the brain. In 
those of advanced age, these resources are less abundantly 
available, and drinking slows down. Drinking is, in short, a 
complex, patterned activity that can be adjusted and corrected in 
accordance with sensory feedback.  
Now think of the role that pleasure plays in drinking water. 
When you are hot and thirsty, you pick up a glass of clean cool 
water and gulp it down with scarcely a hitch. But drinking is easily 
disrupted. It is not easy to gulp a glass of water when you get full, 
and further consumption is actually painful. The same is true if the 
water is viscous, brackish, or unpleasant to taste or smell. And 
drinking is not smooth when other circumstances take priority—
for example, if you are in danger, or are emotionally too aroused or 
too depressed, or are concentrating on something else. Try gulping 
down a glass of water while also reading. But when the water itself 
gives pleasure, you are, first of all, highly motivated to keep on 
drinking, and the act itself is, moreover, made much easier.  
Pleasure is an involuntary positive appraisal; the pleasure you 
take in drinking cool water on a hot day signals that your body 
“approves” of what you are doing. What I am suggesting is that it 
does more than approve; it actually helps you execute the task. 
Taken together, these points suggest that there is a kind of pleasure 
taken in an on-going complex activity like drinking that releases the 
brain’s smooth execution of that same activity.  
Notice how this is different from the relief pleasure I discussed 
earlier. It is concurrent with an activity, not retrospective. It has an 
effect on the activity from which it arises. It may concur with a 
sensation, but this sensation is not the causal driver. (William James 
made much of this point in his theory of the emotions: the feeling is 
not what makes you act lovingly or angrily.) This kind of pleasure 
is defined by the role it plays. We can sum all of this up by noticing 
how there is a difference between savouring a drink of water and 
being satisfied by it. The former is closer to the kind of pleasure I 
have in mind. 
I’ll call this facilitating pleasure. It closes a reinforcing feedback 
loop. My use of the term ‘pleasure’ here does not refer to a 
sensation. Rather, it refers to a state that plays a certain role; my 
concern is functional. Thus:  
Facilitating pleasure is sensory-affective feedback 
from a complex activity that motivates that activity 
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and activates pre-assembled routines that enable its 
smooth execution. 
6.  Aesthetic Pleasure 
Now consider the specific activity of mentally engaging with an 
object. This is a cognitively demanding and difficult task. Even 
Game of Thrones demands intellectual resources; inasmuch as it 
makes you think about loyalty, love, and duty, the Mahabharata 
demands more. Literature asks for your attention, comprehension, 
retention, emotional subtlety, self-awareness of how the writer’s 
language is being used to achieve the effect that it has on you. All 
of this is cognitively complex and demanding. Your enjoyment of 
the activity—the pleasure you take in reading it—facilitates what you 
are doing. You want to keep reading, and this in itself helps you 
continue. This is important, it is the pleasure of reading—of 
mentally engaging with a work of art—not the pleasure of learning 
something new that constitutes a distinctively aesthetic attitude.  
Additional to this, and no less important, the pleasure leads you 
smoothly from one narrative moment to the next, sharpens your 
appreciation of the prose, enables you to overlook the competing 
demands of hunger and tiredness. When you undertake the activity 
in what might be called an educated way, it becomes enjoyable and 
subjectively easier even though it is in fact cognitively complex and 
difficult. The pleasure generated by reading it in certain ways—e.g., 
ways that take context into account and flow with the prosody of 
the writer—help you more than that generated by reading it in 
other ways. This is not merely reactive pleasure; it is not merely a 
sensation that arises. Nor is it merely a consequence of the activity; 
it is not idle. It is pleasure that motivates and aids your engagement 
with the novel.  
Contrast the experience of reading the Income Tax Act of 
Canada in preparation for a meeting. You are not an expert; each 
sentence poses difficulties of comprehension. You are frustrated 
and bored. It’s all you can do to hang on; everything distracts you. 
This is the analogue of gagging and sputtering when foul water is 
all you have to quench your thirst. When you read something 
boring or you drink a foul-tasting liquid for a specific purpose, you 
are motivated to do what you need to do. But if the activity is 
displeasurable, it takes an effort of will to persist, and in any case, 
the ingestion is not smoothly executed. Similarly, reading the 
Income Tax Act is unpleasant and requires an act of will. Note, 
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however—and this is important—that you can get retrospective 
pleasure from having learned the material, just as you can get 
retrospective pleasure from having quenched your thirst with stale-
smelling water. You can, in other words, take pleasure from 
learning something new, even when you don’t enjoy the act of reading. 
In such cases, your motivation comes from the outside. But when 
you read something you love, the pleasure of reading helps you 
concentrate and continue. It’s a self-reinforcing loop. So different 
when you read something difficult for an extrinsic purpose. 
My proposal amounts to this:  
Aesthetic pleasure is sensory-affective feedback from 
the cognitively complex and difficult activity of 
mentally engaging with an object that motivates 
engaging with it and activates pre-assembled 
routines that enable smooth engagement. 
The form of mental engagement can be purely perceptual (looking 
at a sunset), completely intellectual (reading a book), or partly each 
(listening to music or looking at art). The essential point is that the 
pre-assembled routines must be activated by the mental 
engagement, and not by rewards that are distinct consequences of 
that engagement. Looking closely at a sunset can give me pleasure 
because I find evidence in it of tomorrow’s good weather. And this 
may induce me to look at it more closely. But this is pleasure in the 
nature of the sunset, not in the activity of looking. It may reinforce 
looking, but it is not self-reinforcing. To be distinctively aesthetic, 
pleasure must come from and reinforce the activity of mental 
engagement. 
7.  Cultural Learning 
Facilitating pleasure releases the capacity smoothly to execute a 
difficult and complex activity. As the example of drinking water 
demonstrated, the complex routine in question can be automatized. 
But, as I will now show, it can also be learned.  
Think of wine-tasting. When you begin, you might use wine to 
quench your thirst and find that it gives you a pleasant buzz. This 
becomes your way of consuming wine: quaff and get a little drunk. 
Later, though, somebody teaches you how to appreciate the 
structured flavours of wine, and to break flavours down so you can 
describe and identify wine. Now, you gradually begin to get 
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pleasure from it in a different way. Let’s suppose that this new way 
of consuming wine is actually more pleasurable than the old—or 
suppose just that it is a pleasurable alternative. Then you might find 
that you change your ways. The second way of doing things 
supplants or supplements the first because it gives you pleasure. 
This is called reinforcement learning, or as I put it, pleasure-
learning. The pleasure of the new activity unlocks and facilitates 
this new activity. In this particular case, the new activity is more 
complex, but this need not always be true.  
Now, let me introduce one more idea—it’s the last one I need 
for my argument. In any culture, there are creators and consumers 
of art. In general, the consumers have established ways of 
appreciating art, and the creators try to make things in the 
established ways. However, there is innovation. A creator makes 
something that gives pleasure only if it is consumed in a new way. 
To get the idea, go back to the wine-tasting example. Suppose there 
was a time when only the first way of consuming was known. 
Producers made flavourless beverages with 14% alcohol content; 
the consumers quaffed them and enjoyed the buzz of being tipsy. 
The market was in a state of equilibrium.  
Enter now a disrupter. She makes something that tastes quite 
complex, but also has 14% alcohol content. Her product costs 
twice as much. Consumers have to change their method of 
drinking in order to appreciate and enjoy the flavour. But when 
they do, they enjoy the new product in a way that they didn’t know 
before. Gradually, the new product and the new way of tasting 
become established. They don’t necessarily displace the old 
method, though they may—but one way or another, they simply 
come to be used. People are willing to pay the extra cost because 
this is the only way they can participate in the new activity. 
Now, notice that this innovation is, at least initially, a local 
phenomenon. The fact that the new product caught on in Europe 
does not imply that it will catch on India—at least, this was true 
before the age of globalization. So, this is a model for cultural 
learning. A culture will innovate and entrench its own complex 
ways of consuming products made with skill.  
Now, this gives us a model for understanding how abstract 
expressionism got entrenched. Here’s a little parable.  
Once upon a time in New York City, a man called 
Jackson made a painting that negated pictorialism. 
When he first showed it, the public did not want 
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anything to do with it. “What is this a picture of?” 
they asked.  
“It’s not a picture,” Jasper replied: “And it’s 
actually harder than you think to make a completely 
non-pictorial painting. Look at all the clever things 
I have done to prevent you from seeing anything 
depicted there.”  
“Oh, that’s pretty interesting,” said the public. 
“I could spend hours trying to find ways to see a 
picture here, but still see none. I’ve never looked at 
a canvas that way before.”  
And so, the New York public became 
fascinated with abstract expressionism. Jackson 
became famous and made a pile of money. 
A few decades earlier, in Germany, a man called 
Hermann painted people with bright green faces. 
“Humans don’t have green faces,” said the public...  
The parable is, of course, pretty misleading as art history, but it 
shows how one culture-bound practice could develop in New York 
and another in Dresden.  
Of course, none of this is to suggest the absence of cultural 
universals. Perhaps, there are themes or tropes in West African 
sculpture that immediately appeal to people who grew up in 
nineteenth century Paris in exactly the same way as they appeal to 
the people for whom these sculptures were created. But it would 
be surprising if there were no local differences—no aspects of the 
art to which uninstructed Parisians were blind. 
8. Art as Instrument 
Here’s my hypothesis. Artists make art so that consumers can get 
aesthetic pleasure from it—aesthetic pleasure as I have defined it. 
This hypothesis is very different from saying that artists make art 
so that consumers can get pleasurable sensations from it. The first 
proposes a fulcrum of intense engagement; the second mere 
retrospective satisfaction. My idea is that artists make things that 
audiences will engage with in a manner that intensifies and 
reinforces that engagement. The manner of engagement can be 
very different in many ways: it can be a reaction to the strictly 
perceptual properties of a work of art or to the contrast with the 
aims of other artists; it could be through delight or through dark 
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and difficult emotions; it can be spiritual and austere or it can be 
indulgent and sensual. What is important from the perspective of 
an artist is that it should engage the audience in ways that she wants 
the audience to be engaged. Art should be a magnet; it should keep 
the audience attached. But it should be a magnet in the way 
intended by the artist.  
Viewed in this way, art is an instrument. It is made for a 
purpose. And it can be evaluated as an instrument. A knife that is 
made to cut vegetables is a good vegetable knife if it cuts vegetables 
effectively. Similarly, a work of art is a good work of art if it engages 
its audience in the ways intended by its maker. 
Here, then, is a proposal: 
The aesthetic merit of a work of art derives from (a) 
the aesthetic pleasure that (b) it is capable of giving to a 
consumer who (c) shares the cultural background 
of the creator’s target audience, and has (d) culture-
learned optimally to enjoy works that are targeted at 
this audience.3 
Note the four salient components of the view marked above: 
pleasure, capacity, culture, and learning. 
9.  Conclusion 
The proposal I have made is subjectivist. It makes aesthetic value 
instrumental—a good for some end, not an absolute good. It 
addresses the problem of aesthetic obligation by making this 
obligation relative to a purpose. What obligation do I have to 
admire Warhol? None, but if I do, I have an opportunity for 
enjoyment that otherwise I would not have. That is, I would have 
an opportunity to spend time in the self-reinforcing activity of 
engaging with Warhol. 
Secondly, my proposal makes room for critical discourse. I am 
at a Bharatanatyam performance. I think it’s pretty interesting and 
I enjoy the experience. But my friend tells me that the dancers are 
not very good. She points out their mis-steps, their exaggerated 
expressiveness, their lack of coordination with the subtle rhythms 
of the music. The next evening, I go to another Bharatanatyam 
3 This is taken from my paper, “New Prospect for Aesthetic 
Hedonism,” (cited in note 1). 
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performance. This time, I am looking for all of these subtle virtues. 
Consequently, I have so much more to occupy my attention. I have 
just undergone a bit of culture-learning. The critical discourse was 
the instrument of this culture-learning because it brings out the 
artists’ aims, intentions, and methods. This addresses the 
objectivist’s insight that enjoyment must be based on cognitive 
assessments. At the same time, it makes a link between cognitive 
assessment and enjoyment. 
Finally, my proposal makes sense of cultural variability. As I 
argued in Section 7 above, artists innovate, and when audiences 
learn to take them up, they create an insulated community of 
knowledgeable consumers who can approach their product in a 
particular way.  
In my view, only subjectivism can address the problem of 
aesthetic obligation while at the same time accommodating cultural 
variation. But subjectivists need to make room for the objectivity 
of critical discourse. I hope that my version of subjectivism, with 
my account of aesthetic pleasure and its associated cultural learning 
at its centre, accomplishes this.  
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